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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ALLIED MATERIALS COMPANY,
et al.,

Defendants and Appellants
Case No.
8372

vs.

SALT LAKE, GARFIELD & WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
Plaintiff and Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is in general agreement with the statement of facts contained in appellants' brief. However,
certain facts appearing in the record are not referred to
by appellants, which respondent deems to be of material
significance, and further it differs with respect to the
construction placed by the appellants upon certain other
facts referred to.
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Appellants refer to two deeds, executed in 1909, contained in Exhibit 2, pages 23 and 24, which make specific
reference to the respondent's right of way. It should be
pointed out that the reference to this right of way shown
by the deed on page 23 of Exhibit 2 is in this language:
((* ~· * less, that portion of land awarded to
the Saltair Beach Railroad Company (respondent's
predecessor) for right of way, by decree of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, Uta.h, and
also less that portion of said land deeded to the
Western Pacific Railway Company."

In referring to this recital appellants characterize it
as having been made by a stranger. Exhibit 2 shows that
this grantor was a direct predecessor of appellants in the
chain of title to this property, which fact respondent desires to make certain this court shall be fully advised of.
Appellants refer to the erection of respondent's track
with pole line, trolley and guy wires as having occurred
on an undetermined date. With respect to this point, it
is pointed out that while the exact date of construction
was not made a matter of record it is established by the
testimony that this track with its poles, trolley and guy
wires was in existence as early as 1924 which was over
twenty-five years before appellants acquired their interest
in the property. From that date until the time of trial
the physical facts respecting the right of way have remained substantially unchanged. (Exhibit 2, page 67,
R. 24-25)
The foregoing statement is made with due regard to
appellant's contention that defendant Allied Materials
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had no actual knowledge of respondent's claimed interest
in the property prior to its purchase. It is admitted without
dispute that Allied knew of the existence of the tracks,
roadbed, poles, trolley and guy wires and that the same
constituted a railroad line. (R 31) Of even more importance, it also knew that these poles and wires were inside the boundaries of the property which it purchased. It
is further conceded by appellants that Allied did not
know to what point the respondent claimed its right of
way extended and that it never did take the trouble to
ask anyone concerning this vital point. (R 32, 55) Furthermore, Allied did not know and could not discover
from its cursory examination of the premises whether the
poles and guy wires of the respondent were or were not
located upon the railroad property. (R 29, 33) It was
known, for instance, that at some points along the right
of way the poles and guy wires were inside the fence lines
of the adjoining property but at some other points these
same appurtenances were outside such fence lines. (R 33,
50-53)
That Allied did have some concern in ascertaining
the boundary lines of the property in question is evidenced
by the fact that it had a survey made. (R 28, 29) It had
the property abstracted and its attorneys made an examination of the title. (R 32) That abstract was admitted
in evidence as Exhibit 2 and showed the two deeds dated
in 1909 referred to which made specific reference to a
railroad right of way affecting some portion of the property.
That Allied labored under some misgivings concerning its south boundary is evidenced by the fact that it did
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not take in the full measurement of the property surveyed
but stopped eight feet north of that point. (R 24, 54, 55)
Also, the fence of an adjoining owner on the west was
located twelve or thirteen feet north of the line upon
which Allied finally decided to construct its fence. (R 37)
With this situation clearly before it Allied proceeded to
erect its fence and to purchase the property and made no
further inquiry to ascertain respondent's claims to the
property in question. That such an inquiry would have
been easy and would have warned Allied of the true situation is self-evident.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
APPELLANT, ALLIED MATERIALS COMPANY,
HAD ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF
FACTS WHICH REQUIRED IT TO MAKE REASONABLE INQUIRY TO DETERMINE RESPONDENT'S
INTEREST IN THE LAND IN DISPUTE AND HAVING FAILED TO MAKE ANY INQUIRY APPELLANTS ARE BOUND BY ALL THE FACTS WHICH
REASONABLE INQUIRY WOULD HAVE DISCLOSED.
ARGUMENT
Basically the record in this case raises but one substantial issue. Was the defendant, Allied Materials Company, at the time of purchase of the land in dispute on
actual or constructive notice of facts or information that
upon reasonable inquiry would have led said defendant
to discover that respondent was the owner of said land?
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We submit that the record requires a finding on this issue
in the affirmative. The trial court so found and that finding should be affirmed by this court.
Certain facts which are undisputed stand out with
crystal clarity. The first fact is that Allied had an abstract of title to the land which it was buying. This
abstract contained two deeds, executed by a predecessor
in title, which specifically excepted from the land conveyed thereby certain land which had been awarded to
the Saltair Beach Railroad Company for a right of way by
court decree, and another parcel, not described as a right
of way, but which had been deeded to another railroad.
This abstract was examined by Allied's attorneys who had
full knowledge of these recitals. Secondly, at the time of
Allied's purchase the respondent was in possession and
occupancy of the land referred to in said deeds as having
been awarded to it, and had constructed thereon a pole
line, trolley wires and guy wires. This physical evidence
of occupancy was open to Allied and was known. In
fact, the record shows that the guy wires were located
fifteen feet inside the fence line which Allied built and
the poles were eight feet north of the point which appellants claim marks their south boundary according to the
survey which they had had made.
Allied knew that its land adjoined a railroad, it knew
that the above mentioned facilities were on the land which
it was buying and yet in spite of the warning of the recited
facts in the abstract of title and the plain warning of the
physical conditions which it saw and observed, no effort
was made to determine the north line of the right of way.
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No attempt was made to find the condemnation decree
which Allied or its attorneys knew had been entered in the
District Court in Salt Lake County and no inquiry was
addressed to the railroad to find out what land the respondent was claiming as its right of way or if the poles
and guy wires were on the right of way. Later, when this
controversy arose the condemnation decree was found in
the clerk's office of the District Court of Salt Lake County
which showed upon its face that the respondent was the
owner of the land in question. Also, it cannot be denied
that Allied could readily have learned the true facts and
would have been advised of respondent's claims and title
by merely taking the trouble to ask the respondent.
Appellants seek to escape the consequences of Allied's
failure to investigate further the deed reference to the
decree awarded right of way upon the argument that to
require Allied or its attorneys or abstracter to launch upon
a search of the court records would be to impose upon it
a burdensome task which it should not be penalized for
not undertaking.
Appellants brought an abstracter into court who
testified that in about six hours he was able to find this
condemnation decree. That it could have been found in
the beginning by the expenditure of relatively trivial effort is apparent. Six hours of effort would have yielded
the answer and respondent submits that this cannot be
regarded as an unreasonable expenditure of time or effort
to find the solution to this important question. Allied did
not have to make this search itself, nor did its attorneys.
They had at their disposal the experienced skill of an abstracter.
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It is inferred that the reference in the record was
obscure, vague and uncertain; that following the recital
in the 19 09 deeds no further reference was made in the
chain of title to the right of way. The record actually
contained a fund of information. In the first place, the
deeds referred to the railroad which had been awarded the
property, by name. Next, it excepted this right of way
from the property described, which, all who saw it were
bound to know, could be the very land which Allied was
negotiating to purchase. Finally, the diligent searcher was
advised of the county in which the award was made.
Furthermore, the abstract did not disclose the Saltair
Beach Railroad Company had ever conveyed or relinquished its right of way into the chain of title through
which Allied had to claim in order to get a good title. For
Allied to shut its eyes and refuse to ascertain the facts upon
the flimsy ground that it could safely assume that the
right of way did not affect its interest, we submit was not
only unreasonable, it was negligent. No authority is cited
by appellants which sustains the proposition that facts,
such as we have here, which are brought to the attention
of a buyer by a public record as well as physical surroundings, may be ignored.
In O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770,
this court adopted and approved the rule that whatever
is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on
his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to
which such inquiry might lead. And further, that when
a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he
shall be deemed conversant of it. Wood v. Carpenter, 25
L. Ed. 807. See also, Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah
236, 177 P. 763.
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The rule is held to be applicable whether knowledge
of the fact comes by actual or constructive notice. The
effect of such notice is the same in either case. In the
O'Reilly case, supra, purchasers who had been advised of
the existence of a mortgage relied upon the grantor's assertion that it had been paid. This court stated that they
were bound to inquire of the mortgagee to learn if this
was true. Not having done so they were not bona fide
purchasers without notice. In that case, cited with approval, is the case of Taylor v. Mitchell, Kan. 48 P. 859,
which involved an unrecorded mortage referred to in a
deed which was recorded. It was held that the purchaser
was bound by the knowledge obtained from the recorded
deed and could not assume that it had been paid by the
grantee, who, by a clause in the deed, assumed its payment.
The purchaser was bound to ascertain as a fact if the mortgage had been paid by making inquiry of the mortgagee
whose name was disclosed by the deed.
In American Law of Property, Vol. 4, Chap. 11, Sec.
17.11, 17.17 the author sets out that under several circumstances notice is imputed to a purchaser even though he
has no actual knowledge or actual notice:
((Where notice is thus construed to exist it is
known as constructive notice. One form is ((inquiry notice." It exists when the circumstances
are such that a purchaser is in possession of facts
which would lead a reasonable man in his position
to make an investigation that would advise him of
the existence of prior unrecorded rights. He is said
to have constructive notice of their existence
whether he does or does not make the investigation.
The authorities are unanimous in holding that he
has notice of whatever the search would disclose."
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This court has decided several cases holding that possession is notice to a purchaser which requires him to inquire and determine the nature and extent of the right in
the possessor:
Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P. 2d 454
Toland v. Coray, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190
Neponset Land and Livestock Company v.
Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 P. 573

Toland v. Coray, supra, further holds that possession
is notice even without a showing that the person affected
thereby knew of the possession.
In Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526,
this court considered the question of the effect of constructive notice created by matters of record. To this
question the rule was also applied that whatever is notice
enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which an
inquiry might lead and such person will be held to be conversant of facts which could have been discovered upon
inquiry.

It is submitted that the matters presented by the record in this case must be determined by the application of
the rules announced in the foregoing authorities and that
this case is not governed by the cases and authorities cited
by appellants which are in conflict with these authorities.
We desire to now comment upon certain arguments
_in appellants' brief.

It is conceded that the recital in the recorded deeds
(Exhibit 2, pages 23 and 24), did not describe the respondent's property by metes and bounds. It is submitted,
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however, that in every other respect the recital was complete. Appellants characterize the recital in said deeds as
vague or ambiguous. What, may we ask, could be a plainer warning than a direct statement that part of the land
described had been awarded to a specifically named railroad
by a court decree and giving the name and title of the
court where the award was entered? It was a simple, direct and clear statement of the facts. The failure of subsequent grantors to repeat this recital could have no bearing whatsoever upon the effect of this notice. Nothing
was shown in the abstract which indicated that any change
had occurred in the title to this right of way. It was
blind assumption on the part of Allied to presume that
the land being purchased was not affected by this right of
way mentioned in these deeds.
Appellants further complain that the exception clause
in the deed is indefinite in that one cannot tell with certainty whether the land excepted was part of Section 34,
in which the disputed property is located, or in Section 3,
in which section another portion of the respondent's right
of way is located. With this contention respondent cannot agree.
An examination of the exception clause shows that
it follows the parcel described as part of Section 34 and
not Section 3. We submit that a fair construction of the
language shows that the exception can have no relation
to Section 3 at all. Even appellants concede that it could
refer to either or both parcels. If this be true, then how,
in good conscience, may they undertake to decide without
inquiry and upon their own guess that it did not refer to
the tract Allied was buying? If one could not be sure then
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surely he would have some obligation to make certain. Any
other course of action and the one which Allied elected to
follow and rely upon is not the conduct of a reasonably
prudent man.
Next, appellants seize upon the point and argue that
one may ignore the recitals of an exception clause in a
deed to a large tract of land if subsequent deeds to smaller
tracts carved from it omit or fail to make subsequent mention of the exception. No authorities for any such proposition are cited to sustain this argument. The argument
fails utterly to take into account the additional factor of
the effect of the physical possession of respondent to give
further impetus and stimulation to the necessity of an
inquiry to ascertain the true facts. Not only did Allied
have the plain warning of the recorded deed recitals but
in addition the physical evidence was equally strong which
any prudent person would not have ignored.
Appellants appeal to the rule that one may not silently
stand by and conceal his interest in property by failing to
record and then step in and oust a bona fide purchaser.
With the announced rule we have no quarrel but we take
issue with the inference which would apply this rule to the
appellants as entitled to its protection. The presence and
possession of the respondent upon the ground was neither
silence nor concealment. This possession spoke eloquently
to the careful and prudent examiner of the property. It
warned him that he should at least find out the nature of
the claim by making reasonable inquiry.
Appellants seek to escape the consequences of the
notice conveyed by the physical facts by arguing that the
nature of the possession was equivocal and equally consist-
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ent with merely an easement right. Analogies are referred
to such as overhanging eaves, telephone and telegraph poles
owned by utilities being commonly placed in private plots
and which standing by themselves give no notice of a fee
interest. We submit that the attempted analogy is untenable. In the first place, it is common knowledge that
railroad corporations invariably own the fee interest in
their rights of way on their main lines and that they invariably construct their telegraph and other poles and similar facilities upon their own property. Furthermore, the
possession of the disputed ground by respondent was complete. Respondent was not required to stand upon every
square inch of the disputed property or to cover it completely by facilities in order to extend its actual possession
to all parts thereof.
To support their argument that respondent's poles,
trolley and guy wires gave constructive notice only to the
extent necessary to maintain such facilities and therefore
Allied was justified in assuming that this possession constituted a mere easement, the appellants cite certain cases.
Respondent has examined those cases and does not concede
that they announce the rule relied upon. For instance in

Varwig v. Cleveland C. C. and St. L. Railroad Company,
Ohio, 44 N.E. 92, the court merely held that no constructive notice of possession of certain property arose because
the railroad's tracks were adjacent to the land which the
railroad claimed. In that case, on the land in dispute, the
railroad did not have any improvements of any kind which
would indicate that it was the owner or in possession of
the land. Obviously, under such circumstances, notice of
an interest or claim by actual possession could not be relied upon to protect the railroad which had failed to have
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the deed recorded. Furthermore, this case is contrary to
the announced rule in this jurisdiction in the cases of
Meagher v. Dean, supra, O'Reilley v. McLean, supra, Toland v. Cora.y, supra, Lawley v. Hickenlooper, supra, and
Neponset Land and Livestock Company v. Dixon, supra.
It cannot be authority in this jurisdiction because it specifically holds that constructive notice in the absence of a
record even though based upon actual knowledge cannot
be substituted for a record under the Ohio statute. Utah
has clearly rejected any such rule.
So far as Chicago, R. I. and Pacific Railroad v. Welch,
Neb. 118 N. W. 1116 and 1117 are concerned, it is to be
observed that the railroad had not taken possession of and
was not using the land for any of its purposes at the time
the plaintiffs acquired their interest. Furthermore, the
land was separated from the railroad track by a public
highway. Naturally, since there was no notice of possession by use on the part of the company the subsequent
purchaser could not be expected to make an inquiry to determine if the railroad owned the property.

It is only when facts are brought to the subsequent
party's attention which put him upon notice and a duty to
make inquiry that the rule claimed by the respondents has
application.
Two additional cases are cited on page 17 of appellants' brief which are relied upon to support the proposition that pole lines are only notice of an easement.
One of these cases is New York N.H. & H. Railroad
Company v. Russell, Conn., 78 Atl. 324. This case does
not sustain this proposition. It holds, on the other hand,
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that the defendants were not bona :fide purchasers because
when they purchased the land on which the pole line was
located, it was then in existence and this fact constituted
actual knowledge which required them to inquire as to
the interest of the plaintiff, a power company. Having
failed to make such inquiry of the owner of the pole line
which probably would have resulted in defendants learning of the character, extent and ownership of the right of
the power company, defendants were not bona fide purchasers. An injunction against removal of the poles and
wires was granted.
The other case cited is Indianapolis and C. Traction
Company v. Arlington Telephone Company, Ind., 95 N. E.
280. This case likewise does not hold that a pole line is notice
only to the extent of an easement right. It does hold that
the existence of the pole placed the defendant on notice
to inquire concerning the plaintiff's rights. In the particular case the plaintiff's only claim was that of an easement. The court did not have before it the question of
the extent to which such a pole constituted notice of an
interest in the land. Furthermore, the pole in question was
a telephone pole-not a pole which was part of a trolley
line located on a railroad right of way.
Respondent relies upon both of these cases to sustain
its position that from the knowledge which Allied had,
both actual and constructive, it was under a dutyto make
inquiry to determine the extent of respondent's ownership in the land upon which was located its poles and wires.
Appellants point out that all the difficulty here would
have been avoided had respondent but recorded the con-
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demnation decree. With that the respondent must agree.
On the other hand, all the difficulty would likewise have
been avoided had Allied complied with its duty, equally as
great as respondent's duty to record, to make reasonable,
simple and proper inquiry to determine the extent of respondent's interest in the property.
Under Point III of their brief appellants assert that
there is no competent evidence that respondent paid taxes
upon the property in dispute. Certain it is that this property was part of its right of way. Exhibit 3 admitted in
evidence without objection shows without dispute that in
assessing railroad property all property which does not extend beyond one hundred feet on each side of the center
of its track is simply assessed as right of way without further description being required or used and no metes and
bounds description of such property is entered in the assessment record. The exhibit further shows that from 1945
to 1954 respondent made a return of its property to the
State Tax Commission which showed 3.03 miles of main
track located in the Salt Lake City taxing district. The
property involved here is in such district.
Exhibit 4 received in evidence without objection is
the certificate of the Utah Savings and Trust Abstract
Company certifying that the records of the Salt Lake
City Treasurer's Office show the payment of taxes by the
respondent to Salt Lake City Treasurer assessed by Salt
Lake City for the years 1945 to 1954 inclusive. We submit that the finding of the trial court that the respondent
paid the taxes on this land is amply supported by these
exhibits.
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CONCLUSION

· ~1-{~n tJil undisputed facts contained in the record
w~ . tfiat tlie~ellant, Allied Materials Company, purchased
the land in dispute from its grantor in the face of facts
both of record and by the possession of the respondent
without inquiring to determine the extent of the respondent's interest or its title to said land. This constituted a
failure on the part of the appellant, Allied, to discharge
the obligation imposed upon it by the law of his state and
therefore, Allied was not a bona fide purchaser of this
property and the judgment in favor of the respondent
must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
ALBERT R. BOWEN
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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